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I.

INTRODUCTION

Public trials ensure that a defendant is fairly dealt with and not
unjustly condemned, while reminding the prosecutor and judge of
the importance of their functions. 1 Though public trials are
guaranteed in the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions, 2 trial court
judges and appellate courts are at times hesitant to enforce this
fundamental right, leading to improper closures. 3 The Minnesota
Supreme Court recently held in State v. Brown 4 that intentionally
locking the doors of a courtroom during jury instructions does not
implicate a defendant’s right to a public trial. 5 The majority found
that the trial court’s actions were too trivial to affect any of the
defendant’s public trial rights. 6 Because the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the triviality doctrine, it did not apply the
traditional test for alleged Sixth Amendment violations. 7
This case note begins by exploring the history of the right to a
public trial in the United States. 8 Next, it introduces the triviality
doctrine. 9 Then it discusses the facts of Brown and the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s rationale for the decision. 10 It then argues that
the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the triviality doctrine’s
1. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (noting that the
purpose of the public trial guarantee is “for the benefit of the accused; that the
public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned” (quoting
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979))).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; M INN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
3. See Logan Munroe Chandler, Sixth Amendment—Public Trial Guarantee
Applies to Pretrial Suppression Hearings, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 802, 809 (1984)
(noting how the Waller court did not provide much guidance for determining
what is an overriding interest, which “may cause trial judges to close judicial
proceedings for reasons that do not sufficiently outweigh the strong societal
interests weighing in favor of open trials”).
4. 815 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2012).
5. Id. at 617–18.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
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scope beyond its proper application. 11 Next, it argues that the
expansion blurs the analysis between trivial closures and harmless
errors. 12 Finally, this note concludes that Brown will lead to many
unwarranted courtroom closures and advocates for a new rule: the
triviality doctrine should only apply to unintentional closures. 13
II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL
A. Origins of the Right to a Public Trial
The guarantee to a speedy and public trial is generally seen as
a common law privilege originating in England. 14 English judges
consistently applied the guarantee throughout the late seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. 15 The right was not seen as a benefit for
the accused 16 but rather as a way to reinforce the legitimacy of
convictions. 17 Though the original purpose of the public trial is not
the same as it is today, it is often seen as an important aspect of the
American legal system. 18 As one scholar noted, “Without publicity,
all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all
other checks are of small account.” 19
B.

The Public Trial Guarantee in the United States

The founding fathers recognized that the public trial
guarantee provided important safeguards to freedom and chose to
adopt it into the Bill of Rights. 20 In America, the right has
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. Max Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 381 (1932);
see JOSEPH JACONELLI, OPEN JUSTICE : A CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL 5 (2002)
(tracing public trials from common law England to colonial America).
15. Radin, supra note 14, at 389 (“But any feature of the common law was
sure to be noted as a merit, especially in the seventeenth century. . . . [I]n the
eighteenth century . . . the ‘open and public trial’ of the common law [was given]
something of an odor of sanctity.”).
16. Id. at 384.
17. Daniel Levitas, Comment, Scaling Waller: How Courts Have Eroded the Sixth
Amendment Public Trial Right, 59 EMORY L.J. 493, 501 (2009).
18. Compare id. (stating that no matter the original function of the public
trial guarantee, it is hailed by many), with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 599 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that it is a
presupposition of the American legal system that trials shall be public).
19. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827).
20. See Kleinbart v. United States, 388 A.2d 878, 881 (D.C. 1978)
(“The guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to
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universally been recognized as a benefit for the accused. 21 The
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 6
of the Minnesota Constitution confer on criminal defendants the
right to a public trial, with identical language: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial.” 22 A public trial is defined as a “trial that anyone may
attend or observe.” 23 The guarantee is not absolute 24 and at times it
must yield to important government interests. 25 According to the
American Bar Association, all judicial proceedings must be made
accessible to the public, unless the closure follows the proper
procedures. 26 Access is defined as “the most direct and immediate
opportunity as is reasonably available to observe and examine for
purposes of gathering and disseminating information.” 27
Though courts took up the issue throughout the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Davis v. United States
provided the initial framework for modern jurisprudence. 28
The court in Davis held that alleged public trial violations were not
harmless errors. 29 Therefore, a defendant does not need to show

employ our courts as instruments of persecution.” (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 270 (1948))); Radin, supra note 14, at 386 (“The [Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial] is one of the important safeguards that [was] soon deemed
necessary to round out the Constitution . . . .” (quoting Davis v. United States,
247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917))); Fair Trial Guarantees, 32 C.F.R. § 151.7(p)
(2013) (citing public trials as important safeguards to fair trials).
21. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quoting Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)). See generally 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1542
(2013) (noting that the requirement that criminal trials be public is for the benefit
of the accused); SUSAN N. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL ,
at xviii (2006) (discussing the purpose of the Sixth Amendment).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; M INN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
23. BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 1644 (9th ed. 2009).
24. E.g., Waller, 467 U.S. at 39; People v. Colon, 521 N.E.2d 1075, 1077
(N.Y. 1988).
25. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46; see Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Problems Posed by
Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (1961)
(discussing the need to balance defendant’s rights to a public trial and the
government’s need to maintain secrecy in certain situations).
26. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 8, § 3.2(a) (3d ed. 1992),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section
_archive/crimjust _standards_fairtrial_blk.html#3.2.
27. Id. § 3.2 (d)(5).
28. Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 396–99 (8th Cir. 1917) (“A violation of
the constitutional right [to a public trial] necessarily implies prejudice and more
than that need not appear. Furthermore, it would be difficult, if not impossible, in
such cases for a defendant to point to any definite, personal injury.”).
29. Id.
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actual harm to prevail. 30 The Sixth Amendment right was applied to
state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment in
the 1948 U.S. Supreme Court case In re Oliver. 31
The right of the public and press to attend trials was not
guaranteed until the 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 32 The right was applied under the First
Amendment. 33 The plurality opinion found that there was a long
history of open criminal trials and that the fundamental right to
attend criminal trials was implicit in the First Amendment. 34
The U.S. Supreme Court found the closure at issue invalid because
the “trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was
made as to whether alternative solutions would have met the need
to ensure fairness; [and] there was no recognition of any right
under the Constitution for the public or press to attend the trial.” 35
Though the U.S. Supreme Court found that the public and press
had the right to attend criminal proceedings under the First
Amendment, it still grappled with issues of whether the same right
applied under the Sixth Amendment. 36
C.

The Waller Test

In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the broad
courtroom closure of a seven-day suppression hearing during a
criminal trial was unconstitutional. 37 Waller v. Georgia synthesized
prior holdings to provide a clear rule for all alleged First and Sixth
Amendment public trial violations. 38 Writing for the majority in

30. Id. at 398–99.
31. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
32. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
33. See G. Michael Fenner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To
Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 418 (noting
that the right of the public and press to attend was first recognized under the First
Amendment in Richmond Newspapers). Prior to Richmond Newspapers, cases such as
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), held that neither the public nor
the press had a Sixth Amendment right to attend proceedings. Id.
34. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575, 580.
35. Id. at 580–81.
36. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381 & n.9 (noting that there is no “correlative
right in members of the public to insist upon a public trial” and that “only a
defendant has a right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment”).
37. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984).
38. Levitas, supra note 17, at 518.
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Waller v. Georgia, Justice Powell outlined the current four-part test. 39
He held that
the party seeking to close the hearing must [1] advance
an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced,
[2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to
protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and
[4] it must make findings adequate to support the
closure. 40
The Court held that a violation of the public trial guarantee does
not necessarily require a new trial. 41 “Rather, the remedy should be
appropriate to the violation.” 42 The Court reasoned that automatic
reversal would give defendants unfair windfalls that would not be in
the public interest, 43 but reiterated that the defendant does not
need to show actual harm. 44
The Supreme Court recently emphasized the rigidity of the
rule and applied it to every stage of a trial. 45 In Presley v. Georgia, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that every closure must meet the Waller
test. 46 In the brief per curium decision, the Court stated that “[t]rial
courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to
accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.” 47 It also noted
that every closure must be accompanied by “findings specific
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure
order was properly entered.” 48 The majority also held that trial
courts must consider reasonable alternatives for every closure, even
if the parties do not offer them. 49
39. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 49–50.
42. Id. at 50. See generally Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 113–14 (1988) (discussing the
appropriate remedy for Sixth Amendment violations).
43. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 50.
44. Id. at 49 (“[T]he defendant should not be required to prove specific
prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee.”).
45. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214–15 (2010) (holding that a trial
court’s closure during voir dire violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
because the court did not take into account alternatives and did not articulate a
specific enough finding).
46. Id. at 213.
47. Id. at 215.
48. Id. (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984))
(citation omitted).
49. Id. at 216.
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D. The Public Trial Guarantee in Minnesota
Minnesota has generally followed the Waller test, 50 though
recent jurisprudence has allowed more opportunities for
courtroom closure. 51 Specifically, Minnesota now recognizes that
some closures are too trivial to amount to a violation of the Sixth
Amendment. 52 In accord with U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
Minnesota also recognizes that public trial violations are not
subject to harmless error analysis. 53
E.

The Triviality Doctrine

The triviality doctrine holds that certain courtroom closures
are too trivial to affect a defendant’s public trial rights. 54 The
doctrine was developed from the often-cited case Peterson v.
Williams. 55 In Peterson, a courtroom was closed during the testimony
of an undercover agent. 56 The judge inadvertently forgot to reopen
the courtroom prior to the testimony by the defendant. 57 Thus, for
fifteen to twenty minutes, the defendant testified in a closed

50. See, e.g., State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007) (holding
that the trial court failed to provide adequate findings for the closure as required
by Waller); State v. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1995) (remanding the
case in order for the prosecutor to have the opportunity to establish, if he could,
that closure was necessary under Waller); State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 260
(Minn. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not comply with the requirements
of Waller).
51. See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 390 (Minn. 2011) (holding
that the values sought to be protected by a public trial are not implicated when
some spectators are excluded from the courtroom); State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d
652, 660–61 (Minn. 2001) (holding that the closure in question was so trivial that
it did not implicate the right to a public trial).
52. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 617–18 (Minn. 2012) (locking
the doors of a courtroom during jury instructions); Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 390
(removing the mother of the defendant and locking the doors of a courtroom
during jury instructions); Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 660–61 (removing two children
from courtroom during testimony of a witness).
53. State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009).
54. See, e.g., Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 617 (discussing trivial closures); Recent
Cases, Criminal Law—Sixth Amendment—Second Circuit Affirms Conviction Despite
Closure to the Public of a Voir Dire—United States v. Gupta, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1072,
1072 (2012) (noting that the closure in Gupta was too trivial to affect the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).
55. 85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996).
56. Id. at 41–42 (protecting the identity of the undercover agent is a valid
reason for courtroom closure).
57. Id. (stating that failure to reopen was an oversight).
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courtroom. 58 When the judge became aware of the closure, she
immediately took steps to reopen the courtroom, and the defense
counsel repeated all of the defendant’s relevant testimony in
summation. 59
The appellate court in Peterson did not articulate a specific test
for determining a trivial closure, but held that because the closure
was extremely short, followed by a helpful summation, and entirely
inadvertent, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not
infringed upon. 60 The court found that a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment public trial rights are only implicated when a closure
affects the values protected by the right. 61 In trivial closure cases,
there are no actual closures for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment. 62 Thus, trivial closures are not subject to the Waller
test. 63
1. Scope of the Triviality Doctrine
Because the Waller test involves weighing a number of different
interests, “[t]he precise contours of a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment public trial rights are ill-defined.” 64 There is no
specific test for reviewing a closure to determine whether it is
trivial. A recent Florida case presented a helpful three-part
framework to facilitate appellate review. 65 First, a court should
determine whether the public trial guarantee extends to the part of
the trial in question. 66 Second, a court should determine whether a
closure actually occurred for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. 67
Lastly, if there was a closure, a court should determine whether the
closure met the Waller test and was therefore valid. 68 The first issue
is generally not in dispute, as the U.S. Supreme Court in Presley
summarily stated that the Waller standard applies to every stage of a

58. Id. at 41.
59. Id. at 42–43.
60. Id. at 44.
61. Id. at 43–44.
62. State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 617 (Minn. 2012) (noting that certain
actions by trial courts are not considered “true closures”).
63. See Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43–44.
64. United States v. Flanders, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
65. Id. The majority in Brown followed a similar analysis, though it did not lay
out an explicit three-part framework.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1302.
68. See id.
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trial. 69 The last issue is often contested but is not the focus of this
note. 70 The second issue—determining whether a closure occurred
for Sixth Amendment purposes—is where the triviality doctrine
comes into play. 71 If an appellate court finds that the trial court’s
actions were de minimis or trivial, then there is no closure for
purposes of this analysis. 72 If there is no closure, then there is no
constitutional violation and no need to proceed to the Waller test. 73
Courts are reluctant to make a specific test for determining
whether a closure is trivial. 74 Instead, the determination is a factintensive issue for each case. 75 Because there is no set rule,
jurisdictions across the country have addressed the issue
differently. 76 Some courts are extremely hesitant to broaden the
scope 77 or even adopt the doctrine, 78 while others have used it to
allow for more judicial discretion in courtroom closures. 79

69. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010).
70. See, e.g., Hoi Man Yung v. Walker, 468 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting that the trial court did not make findings adequate to support closure);
Sevencan v. Herbert, 342 F.3d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the closure was
necessary to protect an overriding interest).
71. See Flanders, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (discussing whether the closure was
so insignificant that it did not constitute a closure).
72. Id.
73. See Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that
because the defendant’s Sixth Amendment public trial rights were not violated,
there was no need to proceed further).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 689 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“Whatever the outer boundaries of our ‘triviality standard’ may be . . . we see no
reason to define the[m] . . . .”); Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44. See generally John M. Walker,
Jr., Foreword, Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 395,
403–04 (1997) (discussing the different factors that can be used for determining a
trivial closure).
75. See Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44.
76. See generally H.D. Warren, Annotation, Exclusion of Public During Criminal
Trial, 156 A.L.R. 265 (1945) (discussing triviality cases from different
jurisdictions).
77. Gupta, 699 F.3d at 688 (“We have repeatedly emphasized, however, the
[triviality] doctrine’s narrow application.”).
78. See State v. Lormor, 257 P.3d 624, 630 (Wash. 2011) (“While this court
has occasionally suggested that a closure might be trivial or de minimis, we have
not yet been presented with a case or facts that warrant the adoption of this
rule.”); State v. Easterling, 137 P.3d 825, 831–32 (Wash. 2006) (noting that a
majority of the Supreme Court of Washington has never found a public trial right
violation to be de minimis).
79. See, e.g., People v. Colon, 521 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (N.Y. 1988) (holding
that it is within trial court’s discretion to monitor admittance to the courtroom
and therefore not a closure).
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The doctrine is most often cited in cases involving unintentional
closures for short periods of time. 80
F.

Harmless Error Framework

Throughout the early twentieth century, appellate courts
routinely overturned convictions for seemingly meaningless trial
court errors, such as omitting the word “the” from a charging
indictment. 81 Any technical error often resulted in an automatic
reversal. 82 This led to many decisions that gave men and women
convicted of crimes unfair loopholes to get their cases overturned.83
In 1919, Congress sought to combat this problem. 84 Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that “[a]ny error,
defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial
rights must be disregarded.” 85 This rule was seen as a way to
substitute the harsh “automatic reversal” rule in favor of appellate
court judgment. 86 Congress hoped to preserve judicial resources
and improve public confidence in the criminal trial process by
preventing parties from gaming the system by purposely “sowing
reversible error in the record.” 87 The harmless error rule is meant
to apply to errors that are merely technical and do not obstruct the
fair determination on the merits of the case. 88 Only when an error
affects substantial rights is remedial action available. 89
Prior to 1967, all fifty states had some form of a harmless error
rule, though the rule did not apply to federal constitutional error.90
80. Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1076 (2012) (citing United States v.
Gupta, 650 F.3d 863, 874 (2d Cir. 2011) (Parker, J., dissenting)) (finding that in
eighteen cases in which a voir dire proceeding was closed to the public but found
too trivial to implicate the defendant’s public trial rights, many involved an
inadvertent closure).
81. James Edward Wicht III, There Is No Such Thing as a Harmless Constitutional
Error: Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 73, 73 (1997).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 77 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759–60 (1946))
(discussing the policy reasons behind Congress’ decision to pass the harmless
error rule).
84. Id. at 73.
85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
86. Wicht, supra note 81, at 77.
87. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 49 (1967) (“[C]riminal trial[s]
became a game for sowing reversible error in the record.”).
88. 11 PETER N. THOMPSON, M INNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE § 103.02
(4th ed. 2012).
89. Id.
90. Wicht, supra note 81, at 79.
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In Chapman v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court first
acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, violations of the
defendant’s constitutional rights could qualify as harmless error. 91
For the next twenty-five years, courts interpreted Chapman, each
jurisdiction applying harmless error to some rights and not to
others. 92 During this time period, the U.S. Supreme Court found
only five instances, in addition to the examples specifically listed in
Chapman, in which constitutional error was reversible per se 93:
abridgment of the right to self-representation, 94 abridgment of the
right to a public trial, 95 unlawful exclusion of members of the
defendant’s race from a grand jury, 96 failure to assure an impartial
jury in a capital case, 97 and appointment of an interested party’s
attorney as a prosecutor for contempt charges. 98 In 1991, the U.S.
Supreme Court sought to provide a general rule for determining
whether a particular constitutional violation was subject to a
harmless error analysis. 99
In Arizona v. Fulminante, a defendant was incarcerated in New
Jersey on a felon in possession of a firearm conviction. 100 In return
for protection from other inmates, the defendant confessed to an
Arizona murder to a paid informant of the FBI. 101 Using the
confession, the defendant was convicted of the murder and
sentenced to death. 102 The Arizona Supreme Court held that a
harmless error analysis was inappropriate for an alleged coerced
confession and that the confession was coerced due to the

91. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22 (noting that all fifty states at that time had
some form of a harmless error rule and that the Federal Constitution should
receive similar treatment).
92. See David McCord, The “Trial”/”Structural” Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, and
Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1406 (1997) (noting that the Chapman
decision created two major interpretational issues).
93. Id.
94. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
95. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984).
96. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1986).
97. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987).
98. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809–14
(1987).
99. McCord, supra note 92, at 1401 (noting the Chapman court created a
purported bright-line rule for applying different analyses based on whether a
structural or trial error occurred).
100. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 282 (1991).
101. Id. at 283.
102. Id. at 284.
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psychological pressure the informant placed on the defendant, and
ordered a new trial. 103
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the
harmless error analysis applies to alleged coerced confessions. 104
In his opinion, the Chief Justice attempted to create a bright-line
rule to guide future decisions. 105 The majority held that each
constitutional violation is characterized as either a structural error
or a trial error. 106 Structural errors are reversible per se, while trial
errors are subject to a harmless error analysis. 107 Trial errors occur
during the presentation of evidence to the jury and therefore may
be assessed in the context of other evidence presented to the
jury. 108 Structural errors affect the entire framework of the trial
proceeding. 109 The majority found that an involuntary confession
was a trial error and thus subject to a harmless error analysis. 110
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the confession was
coerced and that the defendant must get a new trial. 111
The right to a public trial is considered a structural error and
would normally be reversible per se. 112 In Waller, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the remedy must be appropriate to the violation. 113
Thus, a defendant does not need to show harm to prevail, but he or
she is also not entitled to automatic reversal. 114 Minnesota has
followed this rule and does not apply a harmless error analysis or
an automatic reversal to public trial violations. 115

103. Id.
104. Id. at 296.
105. McCord, supra note 92, at 1410–11.
106. Id. at 1411.
107. Id. at 1401.
108. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–08.
109. Id. at 310.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 309–10.
113. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984).
114. See id.
115. See State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 259–61 (Minn. 1992) (discussing
Fulminante and other U.S. Supreme Court precedent to determine that public trial
violations are not subject to harmless error analysis or automatic reversal).
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III. THE BROWN DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
On August 29, 2008, Darius Miller was shot and killed outside
Whispers Gentlemen’s Club in Minneapolis. 116 The State charged
Jerrell Michael Brown with first-degree premeditated murder, firstdegree premeditated murder committed for the benefit of a gang,
second-degree intentional murder, and second-degree intentional
murder committed for the benefit of a gang. 117
The State presented evidence that just prior to the murder,
three of Brown’s acquaintances attacked Miller.118 During the fight,
someone yelled, “You better go get a gun.” 119 Immediately
preceding the gunshots, an eyewitness reported seeing an
individual wearing a white undershirt and a large necklace, with his
hair in a ponytail, come up the club stairs. 120 The State introduced
jail security camera footage that showed Brown leaving jail twelve
hours before Miller’s murder, with his hair in a ponytail and
wearing a large necklace, white tank top, and dark pants. 121
Additionally, the State presented evidence showing that a car seen
near the murder scene was registered to the sister of one of
Brown’s acquaintances. 122 The State had an expert testify that a
bullet casing, recovered from a shooting that Brown pleaded guilty
to in 2008, matched that of a casing found near Miller’s body. 123
Following closing arguments, the trial court ordered the
courtroom door be locked for the duration of the jury
instructions. 124 To explain the situation, the judge stated on the
record:
For the benefit of those in the back. I am going to
begin giving jury instructions. While that is going on the
courtroom is going to be locked and people are not going
to be allowed to go in and out.
116. Appellant’s Brief at 10, State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2012)
(Nos. A10-0992, A11-1293), 2011 WL 8479012, at *10 [hereinafter Appellant’s
Brief].
117. Id.
118. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 612, 614.
124. Id. at 614.
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So, if anybody has to leave, now would be the time.
You are welcome to s[t]ay. But I just want to make sure
that everybody knows that the courtroom is going to be
locked. We are all good? Deputy? 125
For the duration of the jury instructions, no spectators were let in
or allowed out of the courtroom. 126 The jury found Brown guilty on
all four counts of murder. 127 The trial court sentenced him to life
imprisonment for first-degree murder, plus an additional year of
imprisonment because the murder was committed for the benefit
of a gang. 128
B.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

After the sentence, Brown filed a direct appeal to the
Minnesota Supreme Court. 129 Before the Minnesota Supreme
Court, Brown argued that he was entitled to a new trial for five
reasons. 130 The court addressed issues of admissibility of evidence,
jury instructions, testimony, impeachment evidence, and the right
to a public trial. 131 The court ruled in favor of the State on all five
issues. 132 This note focuses on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
reasoning in regards to the public trial issue.
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that denials of the
public trial guarantee constitute structural error and are not
subject to harmless error review. 133 The court then addressed the
purpose of the public trial guarantee, citing the Waller standard. 134
The court explained that “[n]ot all courtroom restrictions
implicate a defendant’s right to a public trial.” 135 The court focused
on two recent Minnesota decisions, which found that certain
closures can be “too trivial to amount to a violation of the [Sixth]
Amendment.” 136 The court cited several factors for determining
that the trial court’s actions were trivial, including that the
125. Id. (alteration in original).
126. Id. at 614–15.
127. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 116, at 8.
128. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 615.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 616 (citing State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009)).
134. See id. at 616–17.
135. Id. at 617.
136. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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courtroom was never cleared of all spectators; the trial remained
open to the general public and press; there was no period of the
trial in which members of the general public were absent; and at no
time was the defendant or his family excluded. 137 Thus, the court
found that locking the courtroom doors did not implicate Brown’s
right to a public trial. 138
Writing for the majority, Justice Page also cautioned that the
act of “locking courtroom doors during jury instructions creates the
appearance that Minnesota’s courtrooms are closed or inaccessible
to the public.” 139 The majority concluded by noting that in future
cases, the “better practice” is for the trial court to expressly state on
the record why it locked the courtroom doors. 140
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority erred by finding that locking a courtroom is too
trivial to implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.
First, this section discusses the act of locking the doors of a
courtroom. Second, this section discusses the scope of the triviality
doctrine, specifically addressing what is considered a closure. Then
it discusses intentional actions by trial courts and whether the
triviality doctrine should apply. Though public trials are not subject
to harmless error analysis, this section argues that Brown blurs the
line between trivial closures and harmless errors. This section
concludes by arguing that the triviality doctrine should be applied
only to inadvertent closures and discusses the implications of the
Brown decision on future courtroom closures.
A. Locking the Courtroom During Jury Instructions
Locking a courtroom’s doors during jury instructions is a
relatively common procedure in state courts. 141 The practice
137. Id.
138. Id. at 617–18 (“[T]he courtroom was never cleared of all spectators . . . .
The trial remained open to the public and press already in the courtroom . . . .
[T]he jury instructions did not comprise a proportionately large portion of the
trial proceedings.”).
139. Id. at 618.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., id. at 614; People v. Venters, 511 N.Y.S.2d 283, 283 (App. Div.
1987) (“[D]efendant has raised a serious constitutional and statutory challenge to
the practice, almost universally applied in criminal trials conducted in this State,
of automatically closing and locking the courtroom doors during the Judge’s
charge to the jury.”); Nicholas A. Pellegrini, Extension of a Criminal Defendant’s Right
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prohibits spectators from entering or leaving the courtroom during
the entirety of the jury instructions. 142 This type of closure has been
justified as a “time honored” tradition that seeks to avoid jury
distraction during a critical phase of the trial. 143 This portion of the
trial is of vital importance because a jury must understand all of the
legal issues prior to entering deliberations. 144 Thus, trial judges lock
the doors in order to maintain the jury’s attention. 145
The majority in Brown did not explicitly discuss the role of
discretion by trial court judges, though it appears to give deference
to the trial court judge’s decision. 146 Additionally, other courts in
trivial closure cases have explicitly noted that they defer to the trial
court judge’s discretion in matters of maintaining decorum. 147
Limiting the scope of trivial closures would not take away discretion
from trial court judges. 148 Rather, it would require the judge to
follow the Waller test whenever he or she attempted to close or lock

to a Public Trial: Access to the Courtroom During the Jury Charge, 61 ST. JOHN’ S L. REV.
277, 279 n.9 (1987) (discussing a survey conducted by two attorneys that found
that approximately half of the jurisdictions in the country lock the courtroom
during jury instructions).
142. See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614–15 (noting that the courtroom would be
locked until the jury instructions were complete).
143. People v. Colon, 521 N.E.2d 1075, 1079–80 (N.Y. 1988); Venters,
511 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (“[C]ourtroom closure during the charge in a criminal case,
however hoary and time honored such a practice may be, does not pass
constitutional or statutory muster.”).
144. See Colon, 521 N.E.2d at 1079 (“The charge to the jury is a solemn and
comparatively complex phase of the trial requiring precision and concentration
on the part of both the jury and the Trial Judge.”).
145. See id.
146. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614 (noting that the reason for the closure
according to the trial judge was for the “benefit of those in the back” and not
going further into the reason behind the locking of the courtroom).
147. See, e.g., Davidson v. State, 591 So. 2d 901, 902–03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)
(finding it is generally recognized that judges have the discretion to lock the
courtroom during jury instructions); People v. Hughes, 657 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696
(App. Div. 1997) (finding that it was within the trial judge’s discretion to lock the
courtroom); RENZO D. BOWERS, THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURTS:
A TREATISE FOR TRIAL JUDGES AND TRIAL LAWYERS § 262, at 296 (1931) (recognizing
the inherent power of the trial court to preserve order and decorum in the
courtroom).
148. See William K. Meyer, Note, Evaluating Court Closures After Richmond
Newspapers: Using Sixth Amendment Standards to Enforce a First Amendment Right,
50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 304, 308 (1982) (stating that “[w]hen a judge has discretion
to exclude the public from a criminal proceeding, he must balance the policies
favoring closure against competing interests,” but discretion is allowed unless the
closure extends “beyond [its] necessary scope”).
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the courtroom. 149 Thus, when there are valid reasons to close the
courtroom, the trial court judge would have discretion to maintain
order and decorum. 150
B.

Too Trivial to Affect the Defendant’s Rights: How the Minnesota
Supreme Court Applied the Triviality Doctrine in Brown

The majority in Brown found that locking a courtroom’s doors
does not implicate a defendant’s right to a public trial, though it
acknowledged that future closures of this type would “create[] the
appearance that Minnesota courtrooms are closed or
inaccessible.” 151 In Waller, the U.S. Supreme Court noted “‘the
great, though intangible, societal loss that flows’ from closing
courthouse doors.” 152 The closure at issue in Brown is directly akin
to the harmful closure described in Waller. 153 The majority erred by
applying the triviality doctrine to this type of closure. 154 The
majority should have found that the trial court’s closure implicated
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and remanded the case
for further proceedings to determine whether the closure satisfied
the Waller test. 155 This case note does not argue for or against the
overall merits of the defendant’s public trial claim. Rather, it
argues that Minnesota courts should not classify such closures as
trivial and should apply the Waller test to every intentional
closure. 156

149. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213–14 (2010) (reaffirming the
application of the Waller test to every closure).
150. Cf. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (discussing the
ability of trial court judges to comment on the facts of a case and noting that a
judge’s “discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial, to be exercised
in conformity with the standards governing the judicial office”).
151. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 618 (cautioning that “the act of locking courtroom
doors during jury instructions creates the appearance . . . [of] closed or
inaccessible” courtrooms, so courts should proceed with caution).
152. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (quoting People v. Jones,
391 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (N.Y. 1979)).
153. Compare id. at 42 (closing the courtroom for a suppression hearing), with
Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614 (locking courtroom during jury instructions).
154. See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 617–18.
155. See id. at 627 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
156. See infra Part IV.C.
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1. The Triviality Doctrine’s Expanding Scope in Minnesota
The majority in Brown relied heavily on the analyses of two
Minnesota cases. 157 In State v. Lindsey, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that excluding two minors from observing a criminal
trial “was not a true closure, in the sense of excluding all or even a
significant portion of the public from the trial.” 158 The trial court in
Lindsey relied on a Minnesota statute 159—which the Minnesota
Supreme Court ultimately ruled unconstitutional—to exclude the
two children. 160 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that excluding
“two children of unknown age and unknown relationship to [the
defendant]” did not violate his right to a public trial. 161 Though
Lindsey addressed trivial closures, because it involved the removal of
specific members of the public whereas Brown involved a general
locking of the courtroom, its facts are distinct enough that the
Brown majority should have delved further into the purpose behind
the triviality doctrine. 162
The Brown majority also cited State v. Caldwell. 163 The public
trial portion of Caldwell involved two issues: excluding the
defendant’s disruptive mother and locking the courtroom doors
before jury instructions. 164 The Caldwell court applied the limited
holding of Lindsey to the broader, intentional locking of the
courtroom without considering the issue further. 165 Though the
Caldwell court applied the triviality doctrine to locking a
courtroom’s doors, the opinion did not devote much analysis to the
issue. 166 Additionally, the Caldwell majority’s reasoning might not be
consistent with controlling precedent. The Caldwell court stated
that the “‘values sought to be protected by a public trial’ are
protected when not all spectators are excluded from the

157. See 815 N.W.2d at 617.
158. 632 N.W.2d 652, 660 (Minn. 2001).
159. M INN. STAT. § 631.04 (2000). Though the Lindsey court declared the
statute unconstitutional, it has never been repealed by the legislature and thus
remains in the law. See M INN. STAT. § 631.04 (2012).
160. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 659.
161. Id. at 661.
162. Compare Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614–15 (locking courtroom to all
spectators not yet in attendance), with Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 657 (removing two
minor spectators).
163. 803 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 2011).
164. Id. at 390.
165. See id.
166. See id. (devoting only seven sentences to both public trial issues).
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courtroom.” 167 Though this statement is right in certain
circumstances, many courts have held a closure does not need to
exclude all spectators to violate the Sixth Amendment. 168 The
Caldwell majority also noted that “‘a trial court may, in the
appropriate exercise of its discretion, exclude spectators when
necessary to preserve order in the courtroom.’” 169 Again, this may
be true in certain circumstances. 170 But if in the exercise of
discretion a trial court judge implicates a defendant’s public trial
rights, as would be the case if a judge excluded all spectators as the
majority noted in Caldwell, the judge must make adequate findings
to satisfy the Waller test. 171 Because the two Minnesota cases cited in
Brown are distinct and not in sync with precedent, the majority
erred by not delving further into the purpose and scope of the
triviality doctrine. 172
2. Different Types of Closures and Their Effect on a Trivial Closure
Analysis
As the Peterson court noted, for a violation of the public trial
guarantee to occur, there must be a closure. 173 There is no single
definition of what is considered a closure for Sixth Amendment

167. Id. (quoting Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 661).
168. See, e.g., Smith v. Hollins, 448 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the exclusion of the defendant’s brother and sister violated his Sixth Amendment
public trial rights because the trial court judge failed to make “requisite
particularized findings”). See generally H. H. Henry, Annotation, Exclusion of Public
During Criminal Trial, 48 A.L.R.2D 1436 (1956) (discussing cases from multiple
jurisdictions holding that a closure does not need to exclude the entire public in
order to violate the Sixth Amendment).
169. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 390 (quoting State v. Ware, 498 N.W.2d 454, 458
(Minn. 1993)).
170. See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213–16 (2010) (finding that it
was a violation to exclude the public from the courtroom, even though the judge
believed it was within his discretion).
171. See id. While the trial court judge argued that it was “totally up to [his]
discretion whether or not [he] want[s] family members in the courtroom to
intermingle with the jurors,” the U.S. Supreme Court argued the trial judge did
not satisfy the Waller test prior to closing the courtroom by failing to consider
alternative options. Id.
172. See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 626 (Minn. 2012) (Meyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s reasoning was flawed and the actions of
the Lindsey court were distinguishable).
173. See Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 42–44 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that an
inadvertent closure of the courtroom did not violate defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights).
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purposes. 174 To complicate matters, most jurisdictions recognize
two types of closures: total and partial. 175 A total closure occurs
when “all persons other than witnesses, court personnel, the parties
and their lawyers [are] excluded for the duration of the hearing.”176
Identifying a total closure is straightforward, though disputes have
arisen over how long a complete exclusion of the public must occur
to be considered total. 177 Recognizing a partial closure is not as
clear. 178 A partial closure occurs when only some members of the
public, whether a class of people or specific individuals, are
excluded.179 Some jurisdictions define a partial closure generally as
“[w]hen access to the courtroom is retained by some spectators”
but denied to others. 180 This definition would appear to include
locking a courtroom. Those currently in attendance would retain
access, while those spectators not yet in attendance would be
denied access. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “close” as
“restricted to a particular class.” 181 Again, this definition appears to
include instances where a courtroom is locked from persons not yet
in attendance, though some courts, such as Brown, have held
otherwise. 182
In jurisdictions that distinguish between total and partial
closures, the partial closure is held to a lesser standard. 183 While a
174. Levitas, supra note 17, at 534–35 (noting that courts define closure
differently).
175. Id.
176. Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted)
(citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 42 (1984)).
177. See Levitas, supra note 17, at 535 (discussing Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308,
1315 (11th Cir. 2001), and noting the dispute over whether a total closure for a
temporary time period can be considered a partial closure).
178. See Rachel G. Piven-Kehrle, Annotation, Determination of Request for
Exclusion of Public from State Criminal Trial in Order to Preserve Safety, Confidentiality, or
Well-Being of Witness Who Is Not Undercover Police Officer—Issues of Proof, Consideration
of Alternatives, and Scope of Closure, 32 A.L.R.6TH 171 (2008) (discussing issues of
partial and total closures among different jurisdictions).
179. State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 624 (Minn. 2012) (Meyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing factors that can determine whether a closure is partial).
180. E.g., Haley, 250 F.3d at 1315.
181. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609 (Nos. A10-0992,
A11-1293), 2011 WL 8479014, at *3 (quoting BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 254
(6th ed. 1990)).
182. See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 617–18; People v. Colon, 521 N.E.2d 1075,
1078–80 (N.Y. 1988) (“Defendant’s premise, however, that locking the courtroom
doors during the charge to the jury results in a ‘closure’ of the proceedings, does
not withstand analysis.”).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he impact of the partial closure did not reach the level of a total closure, and
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total closure must be justified by an overriding interest, partial
closures only need a substantial interest to be valid. 184 The rest of
the procedural elements of the Waller test apply, so the trial court
must articulate its reasoning, consider alternatives, and make the
closure no broader than necessary. 185
Minnesota does not recognize the distinction between total
and partial closures. 186 Therefore, whenever a closure occurs and
“a court intends to exclude the public from a criminal proceeding,
it must first analyze the Waller factors and make specific [enough]
findings with regard to those factors.” 187 This may complicate cases
such as Brown, because the closure would need to meet the higher
“overriding interest” standard. 188 Other courts have held that
locking courtroom doors is a closure for Sixth Amendment
purposes, yet still ruled the closure valid. 189 But these jurisdictions
also recognize the distinction between partial and total closures. 190
Thus, a judge may have a substantial interest for locking the
courtroom doors during jury instructions, though it is not clear
whether it would be an overriding interest. 191
This case note does not specifically advocate for or against
Minnesota courts’ recognition of partial closures. Rather, this note
argues that because Minnesota does not recognize the distinction,
it may have affected the Brown decision and the reliance on the
triviality doctrine. Courts are reluctant to order new trials or
remand cases on solid convictions for relatively minor violations. 192
therefore ‘only a “substantial” rather than a “compelling” reason for the closure
was necessary.’” (quoting Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir.
1984))).
184. See, e.g., Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
first Waller factor requires only a ‘substantial’ interest [in] justifying the courtroom
closure, rather than a ‘“compelling” interest.’” (quoting United States v. DeLuca,
137 F.3d 24, 33–34 (1st Cir. 1998))); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753–54 (10th
Cir. 1989).
185. Levitas, supra note 17, at 538.
186. See State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007) (declining to
adopt the substantial reason test for partial closures).
187. United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Brown,
815 N.W.2d at 625 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (“If the actions taken by a trial court
implicate the public trial right, a trial court must apply the Waller standards before
excluding the public . . . .”).
188. See Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 685.
189. See United States v. Flanders, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302–03 (S.D. Fla.
2012).
190. See id.
191. Id. at 1302–03.
192. See Levitas, supra note 17, at 497 (noting the “understandable reluctance
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In Brown, the closure would likely not meet the high threshold for
courtroom closures. 193 But if Minnesota did recognize partial
closures, the case may have been remanded and the verdict would
have been affirmed, without relying on the triviality doctrine. 194
3. The Closure in Brown Analyzed
The triviality doctrine allows closures that do not undermine
the “values served by the Sixth Amendment.” 195 These values,
derived from Waller, are: “1) to ensure a fair trial; 2) to remind the
prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and the
importance of their functions; 3) to encourage witnesses to come
forward; and 4) to discourage perjury.” 196 The third and fourth
values are likely not implicated during jury instructions because the
trial has been completed, and the focus of the proceedings is
between the judge and the jury. 197 Thus, “[t]hese values . . . do not
weigh either in favor or against a triviality finding.” 198
The first and second values should have been the focus of the
trivial closure analysis in Brown. The first value is meant to ensure
that the defendant is fairly dealt with and that the proper
procedures are followed. 199 The second value is an effective
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. 200 As Justice Meyer
of some appellate courts to reverse convictions of appellants who appear obviously
guilty”).
193. Compare State v. Sanders, 719 N.E.2d 619, 623 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
(discussing why there was no overriding interest for the courtroom closure and
noting that “[t]here is little evidence that supports the claim that there was an
adverse atmosphere in the courtroom”), with State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609,
626–27 (Minn. 2012) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (noting that nothing in the record
indicated that there were previous issues with spectators causing distractions or
creating an adverse atmosphere).
194. Compare Levitas, supra note 17, at 497 (reluctance to overturn solid
convictions), with Flanders, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (locking the courtroom
affirmed as a partial closure).
195. Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996).
196. Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46–47 (1984)).
197. Cf. Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the
third and fourth values served by Waller were not implicated during voir dire
because no witnesses were testifying at that time).
198. Id.
199. See Danny J. Boggs, The Right to a Fair Trial, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2
(1998) (noting that “the right to a fair trial . . . is the property of the defendant”
and that “our society and our Constitution generally have made the judgment that
the measure of a fair trial is its adherence to stated processes”).
200. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 n.4 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270
(1948)).
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correctly stated in her dissent, intentionally locking the doors of a
courtroom goes against the values of the Sixth Amendment. 201
Justice Meyer listed several relevant factors to consider in
evaluating these values, including the “length of the closure, the
people excluded from the courtroom, the subjects discussed during
the closure, whether the trial court intended the closure to occur,
and the justifications given by the trial court for closure.” 202
In order to determine whether the closure implicated the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, Minnesota courts should
follow a similar analysis as Justice Meyer presented in her dissent. 203
For Brown, the jury instructions took up a relatively small portion of
the trial. 204 But the subject matter discussed during the instructions
is of vital importance. 205 Therefore, for purposes of this analysis,
neither the subject matter nor the length of time for the closure is
conclusive. The trial court judge did not give a reason for
intentionally locking the courtroom, which weighs against finding
the closure to be trivial. 206 If the majority in Brown had delved
further into the rule and followed a similar analysis as Justice
Meyer, it would have likely found that the closure was not trivial
and remanded the case.
C.

Advocating for an Alternative Rule: Applying the Triviality Doctrine
Only to Inadvertent Closures

This note advocates for a simpler rule: Minnesota courts
should not apply the triviality doctrine to intentional closures.
Other courts are in disagreement about the implication of judicial
intent for courtroom closures. 207 Some courts have questioned the
201. State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 626 (Minn. 2012) (Meyer, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he values of the public trial guarantee are sufficiently implicated under the
facts of this case such that a Waller analysis is required.”).
202. Id. at 624 (citing United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2005); Peterson v. Williams,
85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996)).
203. See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 624.
204. See id. at 618 (majority opinion) (“In addition, the jury instructions did
not comprise a proportionately large portion of the trial proceedings.”).
205. See Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 697
(2000) (discussing the crucial role of jury instructions).
206. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 614.
207. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Quinones, 211 F.3d 735, 737–38 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“In Peterson, the problematic closure occurred as the result of the accidental
failure to reopen after a properly ordered closure, whereas here the door was
intentionally locked by court personnel . . . . In view of these differences, we do
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applicability of Peterson to intentional courtroom closures. 208 The
Peterson court itself acknowledged that it was ruling specifically on
inadvertent closures and not other types of closures. 209 It also noted
that an “intentional (not inadvertent) improper closure could
threaten a defendant’s right to a fair trial, even when the closure is
for a brief time . . . .” 210 The triviality doctrine is most often cited in
cases of accidental or inadvertent closures. 211 In general,
courtrooms should be closed in only the most limited set of
circumstances. 212 Because the triviality doctrine is an exception to
the general rule of protecting public trials, it should be “applie[d]
only rarely and to truly trivial closings.” 213 Undisclosed exclusions of
the public from trials “without the knowledge or assent of the
accused . . . seriously undermine[] the basic fairness of a criminal
trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system.” 214
The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require judges to
follow an analysis similar to Waller for all closures. 215 Locking the
not believe the closure can be considered so ‘trivial’ . . . .”); Kelly v. State, 6 A.3d
396, 407 n.10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“Some courts do consider whether the
closure was inadvertent. Other courts find this factor irrelevant to the analysis.”);
State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 162 (R.I. 2004) (“[The closure] was neither brief nor
inadvertent, but was an intentional restriction . . . . Under these circumstances, the
appropriate relief is the granting of a new trial.”). But see Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d
431, 433 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Whether the closure was intentional or inadvertent is
constitutionally irrelevant.”); State v. Vanness, 738 N.W.2d 154, 158 (Wis. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that the state’s intent is irrelevant, so when the courthouse was
locked for three hours without the judge’s knowledge, it was still a closure).
208. See Brown v. Kuhlmann, 142 F.3d 529, 541 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is unclear
from the analysis in Peterson whether [the intentional closing] would alter the
conclusion that ‘no Sixth Amendment violation occurred.’” (quoting Peterson v.
Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1996))); Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44 n.8 (questioning
whether an intentional closure may threaten a defendant’s public trial right, even
if the closure is brief).
209. See Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43 n.4 (noting that even though the defendant
cited three cases in support of his argument that the closure was improper,
“[n]one of them discusses inadvertent or negligent closures at all”).
210. Id. at 44 n.8.
211. See United States v. Gupta, 650 F.3d 863, 874–75 (2d Cir. 2011) (Parker,
J., dissenting) (discussing cases of trivial closures during jury selection and noting
that most involved inadvertent closures), vacated, 699 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2012);
Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1076 (noting that in many instances, the triviality
doctrine is used in inadvertent closures).
212. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984) (stating that there is a
presumption of openness in trials).
213. Gupta, 650 F.3d at 874.
214. Id.
215. See M INN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02, subdiv. 4(4)(c), (e) (stating that there must
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courtroom doors, when the Minnesota rules governing closures
and the Minnesota Supreme Court precedents are clear, creates an
appearance of unfairness and a closed judiciary. 216 Trial court
judges who exclude some members of the public without following
the proper analysis are ignoring clear precedent and creating an
appearance of unfairness in the judiciary; this act goes against the
values protected by the public trial guarantee and should be
considered a closure for constitutional purposes. 217
Requiring trial court judges who intentionally close the
courtroom to outside spectators to follow the Waller test promotes
fairness and confidence in the judiciary. 218 By using the triviality
doctrine only in a limited set of circumstances, Minnesota would
more closely follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent. 219 As the
U.S. Supreme Court noted in Press-Enterprise, the value of openness
that a public trial guarantees “lies in the fact that people not
actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of
fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free
to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being
followed and that deviations will become known.” 220 Limiting the
scope of the triviality doctrine would provide appellate courts a
better opportunity to review the case and promote public
confidence in the judiciary. 221 Applying the triviality doctrine only
be an overriding interest for the closure, the closure must be no broader than is
necessary, the judge must consider reasonable alternatives, and the judge must
make findings of fact on the record).
216. See State v. Brown 815 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2012) (“[W]e caution that
the act of locking courtroom doors during jury instructions creates the
appearance that Minnesota’s courtrooms are closed or inaccessible to the
public.”).
217. Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (observing that the
second value is to remind the judge of his or her responsibility and the
importance of his or her function).
218. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948) (noting the societal
benefits of spectators learning more about government and gaining confidence in
the judiciary); Levitas, supra note 17, at 529 (finding that the U.S. Supreme Court
in Waller and In re Oliver incorporated the public trial right based on fairness
principles).
219. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 215–16 (2010) (reinforcing the
rigidity of the Waller test on courtroom closures).
220. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (emphasis in
original).
221. Compare Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 618 (aiming to maintain confidence in the
judiciary and facilitate appellate review), with United States v. Gupta, 699 F.3d 682,
689 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Press-Enter., 464 U.S. at 687) (finding knowledge that
anyone is free to attend a trial inspires confidence), and Levitas, supra note 17,
at 509–10 (noting that the elements of Waller create a “suitable record for
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to inadvertent closures would prevent the slippery slope of which
the majority seems wary.
D. Blurring the Line Between the Triviality Doctrine and a Harmless
Error Analysis
The triviality doctrine, as an exception to the traditional rules
for public trial violations, should be used only in a limited set of
circumstances, 222 though the Brown court expanded it to intentional
closures. 223 With this expansion, the court further blurred the
analysis between trivial closures and harmless errors. 224
The Brown court correctly stated that “[d]enials of the public
trial guarantee constitute structural error not subject to harmless
error review.” 225 But later in the majority’s decision, the court noted
that “nothing in the trial court or postconviction court record
provides factual support for any claim that any particular person
was denied entrance.” 226 The latter statement leaves open the
question of whether the decision may have come out differently if
the defendant had proven that specific spectators were excluded.
The two statements by the court indicate different lines of
reasoning that complicate the analysis for future decisions in
Minnesota.
1. Tension Between Trivial Closure Analysis and Harmless Error
Analysis
Courts have recognized the tension between trivial closures
and harmless errors. 227 In explaining how the triviality doctrine
differs from a harmless error analysis, the Second Circuit stated
that “[t]he inquiry is not whether the defendant suffer[ed]
appellate review”).
222. United States v. Gupta, 650 F.3d 863, 874 (2d Cir. 2011) (Parker, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 699 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2012).
223. See Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 618.
224. See Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Beyond Harmless Error: ‘Triviality’
of Intrusions, 237 N.Y. L.J., July 3, 2007, at 3, available at LEXIS (discussing the
expansion of the triviality doctrine and harmless error ranging from public trial
issues to restrictions on communications between client and counsel).
225. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 616 (citing State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 139
(Minn. 2009)).
226. Id. at 618 n.5.
227. See Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1072 (discussing the Second Circuit’s
application of the triviality doctrine and the tension it has with U.S. Supreme
Court precedent).
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‘prejudice’ or ‘specific injury.’”228 Rather, regardless of whether the
defendant is guilty or innocent, the court determines whether the
defendant was deprived of protections provided in the Sixth
Amendment. 229 Similar to the Brown court’s analysis, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the focus of the trivial
closure analysis is on what transpired during the closed
proceedings, not the impact on the overall outcome of the trial. 230
Focusing on what actually occurred during the proceeding is
misguided because the openness of the proceeding itself,
regardless of what actually transpired during the closure, is what
promotes the appearance of fairness in the judiciary. 231
Though the triviality doctrine focuses on the rights of the
defendant and not his overall guilt or innocence, deciding which
errors are “so small that they do not warrant reversal inevitably
invites fears of a ‘slippery slope,’ and comparison with the
‘harmless error analysis’ used for trial errors.” 232 As the majority in
Waller noted, the benefits of a public trial are often intangible, yet
great. 233 So, just as it is difficult to point to specific prejudice for a
harmless error analysis, 234 it is also difficult for a defendant to point
to specific facts that prove that the values behind the public trial
guarantee were implicated. 235 Because the benefits of public trials
are often intangible, courts may have difficulties properly weighing
the harm and benefit of a closure. 236
In determining whether a closure is constitutional, courts do
not look for actual harm because it is difficult for the defendant to
228. Id. at 1073–74 (quoting United States v. Gupta, 650 F.3d 863, 867
(2d Cir. 2011), vacated, 699 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2012)) (second alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
229. Gupta, 699 F.3d at 688 (quoting Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 42
(2d Cir. 1996)).
230. Compare Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 617–18 n.5 (noting that no one in the
defendant’s party was improperly excluded and that the defendant could not
point to anyone who was actually denied admittance), with Recent Cases,
supra note 54, at 1076–77 (quoting Gupta, 650 F.3d at 869) (requiring the
defendant to point to evidence showing that his rights were affected).
231. Gupta, 699 F.3d at 689.
232. Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Structural Errors in Criminal
Trials, 242 N.Y. L.J., July 29, 2009, at 4, available at LEXIS.
233. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984).
234. Id.
235. See Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1077 (discussing the effect of
requiring defendant to prove harm on the defendant’s rights).
236. See Wicht, supra note 81, at 93–94 (arguing that appellate courts cannot
effectively weigh the impact of a constitutional error).
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prove. 237 Instead, appellate courts focus on whether the trial court
met its obligations before the closure. 238 But when determining
whether a closure is trivial, part of a court’s analysis looks for the
defendant to show that his or her public trial rights were
implicated. 239 By looking for a tangible piece of evidence to weigh
for or against a trivial closure, courts are inching closer to a
harmless error analysis. 240 When noting that the defendant did not
show that any spectators were actually denied admittance,
Minnesota courts are requiring a defendant to prove something
that the law and precedent say he or she should not have to
prove. 241 By applying the triviality doctrine only to inadvertent
closures, Minnesota courts would limit the tension between the two
analyses. When these two analyses become blurred, courts are
limiting the application of a defendant’s fundamental right. 242
E.

Brown’s Expanding Role in Allowing Courtroom Closures During
Jury Instructions and Other Trial Proceedings

At the end of the public trial section in the Brown opinion, the
Minnesota Supreme Court appears to acknowledge that its new
precedent “creates the appearance that Minnesota’s courtrooms
are closed or inaccessible to the public.” 243 Thus, the court draws on
the Waller test and suggests that future courts expressly state the

237. See Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1075–76 (noting that a defendant does
not need to show actual prejudice to prevail).
238. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48–49 (stating that the four-part test focuses on the
actions of the judge prior to the closing).
239. See Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1076 (noting two criteria for analyzing
trivial closures, and stating that courts look to see “whether any specific event
occurred during the closure that undermined the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
protections”).
240. Id. at 1078 (discussing Gupta and finding that the analysis is “very similar
to a harmless error inquiry”).
241. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (noting the defendant does not need to
show actual harm).
242. Compare Recent Cases, supra note 54, at 1077 (“This erosion of the
defendant’s ability to remedy a violation is exacerbated by the fact that the
remaining avenue—asking whether anything significant occurred—requires
appellate courts to have access to information that will often be unavailable.”),
with Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9 (having a defendant show prejudice “would in most
cases deprive [the defendant] of the [public-trial] guarantee, for it would be
difficult to envisage a case in which he would have evidence available of specific
injury” (quoting United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (3d Cir.
1969)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
243. See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2012).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss1/8

28

Cronen: Criminal Law: Behind Closed Doors: Expanding the Triviality Doctr

280

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

reasons for the closure on the record. 244 But the Brown court
affirmed the trial court’s decision, which lacked any articulated
reason for the closure. 245 Therefore, the Brown decision sets a very
low threshold for courtroom closures and leaves open questions for
how future decisions will be addressed. 246 There is a strong
potential that “creeping courtroom closure[s]” may become
commonplace in Minnesota courts. 247
A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision relied on Brown
to uphold a locked courtroom for the stated reason that “[g]oing
in and out [during a proceeding] obviously creates some
disruptions and distractions.” 248 Another post-Brown case affirmed a
closure for the stated reason of “[i]t’s just a tradition.” 249 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in response to the defendant’s
argument that Brown advocates for a limited application of the
triviality doctrine, noted only that “[w]e do not encourage or
condone closing and locking courtroom doors during trial. . . .
[W]e highlight Brown’s reference to the ‘better practice,’ but
conclude it does not require reversal here.” 250 While the majority in
Brown hoped to limit the application of closures without expressly
stated reasons on the record, it is clear that the standard practice in
Minnesota courtrooms is to lock the doors during jury instructions
without any qualified reason.
Not only has Brown been cited to allow courtroom closures
during jury instructions, the Minnesota Court of Appeals cited the
case to uphold locking the courtroom during closing arguments. 251
244. Compare id. (“To facilitate appellate review in future cases, we conclude
the better practice is for the trial court to expressly state on the record why the
court is locking the courtroom doors.”), with Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 (“The interest
[for the courtroom closure] is to be articulated along with findings specific
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was
properly entered.” (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984))).
245. Brown, 815 N.W.2d at 625 (stating on the record that the closure was “for
the benefit of those in the back”).
246. See Rosenberg, supra note 232 (discussing the tensions between the
triviality doctrine and automatic reversal for structural errors).
247. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 609 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
248. Id. at 600.
249. State v. Richmond, No. A12-0899, 2013 WL 1942995, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 13, 2013).
250. Id. at *6.
251. See State v. Lane, No. A12-0833, 2013 WL 2459894, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 10, 2013).
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The Brown decision was also cited to allow a courtroom to be
locked during individual questioning of jurors regarding their
exposure to potentially prejudicial material during trial. 252 The
exact scope of Brown’s precedent is unclear, but recent
jurisprudence indicates that it will be used to expand the triviality
doctrine to other parts of a trial.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court was presented with the difficult
question of determining whether intentionally locking the doors of
a courtroom before jury instructions violates a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights. 253 The majority determined that the trial
court’s actions were too trivial to be considered a closure, and
therefore the defendant’s rights were not implicated. 254 Though
locking the courtroom is a relatively common procedure, and may
be constitutional in certain circumstances, the majority failed to
properly analyze the purpose and scope of the triviality doctrine
when it was applied to intentional closures. The decision further
muddies the analysis between trivial closures and harmless errors,
running afoul of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The Minnesota
Supreme Court should have limited the scope of the triviality
doctrine and applied it only to inadvertent closures. Though the
majority attempted to put in checks for future cases, Brown sets a
very low standard that will lead to many unwarranted courtroom
closures. 255

252. See State v. Trautman, No. A12-0929, 2013 WL 2301796, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. May 28, 2013).
253. See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 2012).
254. Id. at 618.
255. See State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 608 n.1 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson,
J., dissenting) (“[D]uring the 2011–12 term, [the Minnesota Supreme Court]
denied five petitions for review that challenged the district court’s decision to
close or lock the courtroom doors during final jury instructions.”).
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